Definitions - Psychological Types

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Introjection

Introjection: This term was introduced by Avenarius to correspond with projection. The frans-veying therewith intended, of a subjective content into an object is, however, just as well expressed by the concept of projection. It would, therefore, be as well to retain the term ‘projection’ for this process. Ferenczi has now defined the concept of introjection as the opposite of projection, namely, as an ‘indrawing’ of the object within the subjective circle of interest, while projection means a translation of subjective contents into the object. ”Whereas the paranoic expels from his ego emotions which have become disagreeable, the neurotic helps himself to as large a portion of the outer world as his ego can ingest, and makes this an object of unconscious phantasies”. The former mechanism is projection, the latter introjection. Introjection is a sort of ”diluting process“, an ”expansion of the circle of interest“. According to Ferenczi, introjection



is also a normal process. Psychologically, therefore, it is a process of assimilation, while projection is a process of dissimilation. Introjection signifies an adjustment of the object to the subject, while projection involves a discrimination of the object from the subject, by means of a subjective content transveyed into the object.



Introjection is an extraverting process, since for this adjustment to the object a feeling-into, or possession of, the object is necessary.



A passive and an active introjection may be discriminated: to the former belong the transference-processes in the treatment of the neuroses and, in general, all cases in which the object exercises an unconditional attraction upon the subject; while feeling-into, regarded as a process of adaptation, should belong to the latter form.

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Introversion


Introversion means a turning inwards of the libido (q.v.), whereby a negative relation of subject to object is expressed. Interest does not move towards the object, but recedes towards the subject. Everyone whose attitude is introverted thinks, feels, and acts in a way that clearly demonstrates that the subject is the chief factor of motivation while the object at most receives only a secondary value. Introversion may possess either a more intellectual or more emotional character, just as it can be characterized by either intuition or sensation. Introversion is active, when the subject wills a certain seclusion in face of the object; it is passive when the subject is unable to restore again to the object the libido which is streaming back from it. When introversion is habitual, one speaks of an introverted type (v. Type).

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Intuition


Intuition (from intueri = to look into or upon) is, according to my view, a basic psychological function (v. Function). It is that psychological function which transmits perceptions in an unconscious way. Everything, whether outer or inner objects or their associations, can be the object of this perception. Intuition has this peculiar quality: it is neither sensation, nor feeling, nor intellectual conclusion, although it may appear in any of these forms. Through intuition any one content is presented as a complete whole, without our being able to explain or discover in what way this content has been arrived at. Intuition is a kind of instinctive apprehension, irrespective of the nature of its contents. Like sensation (q.v.) it is an irrational (q.v.) perceptive function. Its contents, like those of sensation, have the character of being given, in contrast to the 'derived' or 'deduced' character of feeling and thinking contents. Intuitive cognition, therefore, possesses an intrinsic character of certainty and conviction which enabled Spinoza to uphold the ‘scientia intuitiva’ as the highest form of cognition. Intuition has this quality in common with sensation, whose physical foundation is the ground and origin of its certitude. In the same way, the certainty of intuition depends upon a definite psychic matter of fact, of whose origin and state of readiness, however, the subject was quite unconscious.



Intuition appears either in a subjective or an objective form: the former is a perception of unconscious psychic facts whose origin is essentially subjective; the latter is a perception of facts which depend upon subliminal perceptions of the object and upon the thoughts and feelings occasioned thereby.



Concrete and abstract forms of intuition may be distinguished according to the degree of participation on the part of sensation. Concrete intuition carries perceptions which are concerned with the actuality of things, while abstract intuition transmits the perceptions of ideational Associations. Concrete intuition is a reactive process, since it follows directly from the given circumstances; whereas abstract intuition, like abstract sensation, necessitates a certain element of direction, an act of will or a purpose.



In common with sensation, intuition is a characteristic of infantile and primitive psychology. As against the strength and sudden appearance of sense-impression it transmits the perception of my thological images, the precursors of ideas (#.v.).



Intuition maintains a compensatory function to sensation, and, like sensation, it is the maternal soil from which thinking and feeling are developed in the form of rational functions. Intuition is an irrational function, notwithstanding the fact that many intuitions may subsequently be split up into their component elements, whereby their origin and appearance can also be made to harmonize with the laws of reason. Everyone whose general attitude is orientated by the principle of intuition, i.e. perception by way of the unconscious, belongs to the intuitive type (v. Type),



According to the manner in which intuition is employed, whether directed within in the service of cognition and inner perception or without in the service of action and accomplishment, the introverted and extraverted intuitive types can be differentiated.



In abnormal cases a well-marked coalescence with, and an equally great determination by, the contents of the collective unconscious declares itself: this may give the intuitive type an extremely irrational and unintelligible appearance.

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Irrational


Irrational: As I make use of this term it does not denote something contrary to reason, but something outside the province of reason, whose essence, therefore, is not established by reason.



Elementary facts belong to this category, e.g. that the earth has a moon, that chlorine is an element, that the greatest density of water is found to be 4.0 centigrade. An accident is also irrational in spite of the fact that it may sustain a subsequent rational explanation.



The irrational is a factor of existence which may certainly be pushed back indefinitely by an increasingly elaborate and complicated rational explanation, but in so doing the explanation finally becomes so extravagant and overdone that it passes comprehension, thus reaching the limits of rational thought long before it can ever span the whole world with the laws of reason. A completely rational explanation of an actually existing object (not one that is merely postulated) is a Utopian ideal. Only an object that has been postulated can also be completely explained on rational grounds, since it has never contained anything beyond what was postulated by rational thinking. Empirical science also postulates rationally limited objects, since its deliberate exclusion of the accidental allows no consideration of the real object as a whole; hence empirical observation is always limited to that same portion of the object which has been selected for rational consideration. Thus, both thinking and feeling as directed functions are rational. When these functions are concerned not with a rationally determined choice of objects, or with the qualities and relations of objects, but with the incidental perceptions which the real object never lacks, they at once lose the quality of direction, and therewith something of their rational character, because they accept the accidental. They begin to be irrational. That thinking or feeling which is directed according to accidental perceptions, and is therefore irrational, is either intuitive or sensational. Both intuition and sensation are psychological functions which achieve their functional fulfilment in the absolute perception of occurrences in general. Hence, in accordance with their nature, their attitude must be set towards every possibility and what is absolutely accidental; they must, therefore, entirely forgo rational direction. Accordingly I term them irrational functions, in contrast to thinking and feeling, which reach perfection only when in complete accord with the laws of reason.



Although the irrational, as such, can never become the object of a science, nevertheless for a practical psychology it is of the greatest importance that the irrational factor should be correctly appraised. For practical psychology stirs up many problems that altogether elude the rational solution and can be settled only irrationally, i.e. they can be solved only in a way that has no correspondence with the laws of reason. An exclusive presumption or expectation that for every conflict there must also exist a possibility of rational adjustment may well prove an in-surmountable obstacle to a real solution of an irrational character, (v. Rational).

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Libido

Libido: In my view, this concept is synonymous with psychic energy. Psychic energy is the intensity of the psychic process its psychological value. By this I do not mean to imply any imparted value, whether moral, aesthetic, or intellectual; the psychological value is simply conditioned by its determining power, which is manifested in definite psychic operations ('effects'). Neither do I understand libido as a psychic force, a misunderstanding that has led many critics astray. I do not hypostasize the concept of energy, but employ it as a concept denoting intensity or value. The question as to whether or no a specific psychic force exists has nothing to do with the concept of libido.



Frequently I employ the expression libido promiscuously with ‘energy’. My justification for calling psychic energy libido has been fully gone into in the works referred to in the footnote.

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The Objective Plane


The Objective Plane: When I speak of interpretation upon the objective plane, I am referring to that view of a dream or phantasy by which the persons or conditions appearing therein are referred to objectively real persons or conditions; whereas I speak of the subjective plane (q.v.) when the persons and conditions appearing in a dream are referred exclusively to subjective elements. The Freudian view of the dream moves almost exclusively upon the objective level, inasmuch as dream-wishes are interpreted as referring to real objects, or are related to sexual processes which fall within the physiological, and therefore extra-psychological, sphere.

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Orientation


Orientation: This term is used to denote the general principle of an attitude (q.v.). Every attitude is orientated by a certain point-of-view, no matter whether that point-of-view be conscious or unconscious. A so-called power-attitude is orientated by the viewpoint of ego-power exerted against oppressive influences and conditions. A thinking attitude is orientated by the principle of logic as its supreme law; a sensational attitude by the sensuous perception of given facts.

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"Participation Mystique”



"Participation Mystique”: This term originates with Levy-Bruhl. It connotes a peculiar kind of psychological connection with the object wherein the subject is unable to differentiate himself clearly from the object to which he is bound by an immediate relation that can only be described as partial identity. This identity is based upon an a priori oneness of subject and object “Participation mystique“, therefore, is a vestigial remainder of this primordial condition. It does not apply to the whole subject-object relation, but only to certain cases in which the phenomenon of this peculiar relatedness appears. It is, of course, a phenomenon that is best observed among the primitives; but it occurs not at all infrequently among civilized men, although not with the same range or intensity. Among civilized peoples it usually happens between persons and only seldom between a person and thing. In the former case it is a so-called state of transference, in which the object (as a general rule) obtains a sort of magical, i.e. unconditional, influence over the subject In the latter case it is a question of a similar influence on the part of a thing, or else a kind of identification with a thing or the idea of a thing.

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Phantasy

Phantasy: By phantasy I understand two different things, namely, (1) phantasm and (2) Imaginative activity. In my writings the context always shows which of these meanings is intended. When the term is used to denote



phantasm it represents a complex that is distinguished from other complexes by the fact that it corresponds with no actual external state of affairs. Although a phantasm may originally be based upon the memory-images of actual experiences, its content corresponds with no external reality; it is merely the output of the creative psychic activity, a manifestation or product of the combination of psychic elements. In so far as psychic energy can be submitted to voluntary direction, phantasy may also be consciously and deliberately produced, as a whole or at least in part. In the former case, it is merely a combination of conscious elements. But such a case is only an artificial experiment of purely theoretical importance. In actual everyday psychological experience, phantasy is either released by an expectant, intuitive attitude, or appears as an involuntary irruption of unconscious contents into consciousness.



We must differentiate between active and passive phantasy. Active phantasies are called forth by intuition, i.e. by an attitude directed to the perception of unconscious contents in which the libido immediately invests all the elements emerging from the unconscious, and, by means of association with parallel material, brings them to definition and plastic form. Passive phantasies without any antecedent or accompanying intuitive attitude appear from the outset in plastic form in the presence of a wholly passive attitude on the part of the cognizing subject Such phantasies belong to the category of psychic ”automatismes” (Janet). Naturally these latter can occur only as the result of a relative dissociation of the psyche, since their occurrence presupposes the withdrawal of an essential sum of energy from conscious control with a corresponding activation of unconscious material. Thus the vision of Saul presupposes an unconscious acceptance of Christianity, though the fact had escaped his conscious insight.



It is probable that passive phantasy always springs from an unconscious process antithetically related to consciousness, but one which assembles approximately the same amount of energy as the conscious attitude, whence also its capacity for breaking through the latter’s resistance.



Active phantasy, on the contrary, owes its existence not merely to a onesided, intensive, and antithetic unconscious process, but just as much to the propensity of the conscious attitude for taking up the indications or fragments of relatively lightly-toned unconscious associations, and developing them into complete plasticity by association with parallel elements. In the case of active phantasy, then, it is not necessarily a question of a dissociated psychic state, but rather of a positive participation of consciousness.

Whereas the passive form of phantasy not infrequently bears the stamp of morbidity or at least some trace of abnormality, active phantasy belongs to the highest form of psychic activity. For here, in a converging stream, flow the conscious and unconscious personality of the subject into a common and reconciling product. A phantasy thus framed may be the supreme expression of the unity of an individual; it may even create the individual by the consummate expression of its unity. (Cf. Schiller’s concept of the “aesthetic disposition”). As a general rule, passive phantasy is never the expression of an individuality that has achieved unity, since, as already observed, it presupposes a considerable degree of dissociation, which in its turn can result only from an equally strong opposition between the conscious and the unconscious. Hence the phantasy that breaks through into consciousness as the result of such a state, can never be the perfected expression of a united individuality, but only the prevailing standpoint of the unconscious personality. The life of St Paul is a good example of this: his conversion to the Christian faith corresponded with an acceptance of the hitherto unconscious standpoint and a repression of his previous anti-Christian point of view which latter soon became noticeable in his hysterical fits. Hence, passive phantasy must always require a conscious criticism, if it is not to substantiate the onesided standpoint of the unconscious antithesis. Whereas active phantasy, as the product, on the one hand of a conscious attitude which is not opposed to the unconscious, and, on the other, of unconscious processes which do not maintain an antithetic so much as a compensatory relation to consciousness, does not require this criticism, but merely understanding.



As with the dream (which is merely passive phantasy) a manifest and a latent meaning must be distinguished also in phantasy. The former results from the immediate perception of the phantasy-image, and the immediate statement of the complex represented by the phantasy. Frequently, however, the manifest meaning hardly deserves the name, although it is always far more developed in phantasy than in the dream; probably this arises from the fact that the dream-phantasy usually requires no particular energy wherewith to make an effective opposition to the feeble resistance of the sleeping consciousness; whence it also follows that few antagonistic and only rather slight compensatory tendencies can obtain representation. Waking phantasy, on the other hand, must command a considerable sum of energy in order to overcome the inhibition proceeding from the conscious attitude.

Hence, for this to take place, the unconscious antithesis must already be very important before its entrance into consciousness can become possible. If it consisted only in vague and hardly seizable indications, it would nevei be able so to divert conscious attention (conscious libido) upon itself as effectually to interrupt the associated continuity of consciousness. Hence the unconscious content is dependent upon a very strong inner connection, which reveals itself in a manifest meaning. The manifest meaning always has the character of a plastic and concrete process, which, on account of its objective unreality, can never satisfy the conscious demand for understanding. Hence another signification, in other words, an interpretation, or latent meaning, has to be sought. Although the existence of a latent meaning of phantasy is by no means certain, and although nothing stands in the way of an eventual challenge of the whole possibility of a latent meaning, yet the demand for a satisfying understanding is motive enough for a thorough-going investigation. This-investigation of the latent meaning may be purely causal, inquiring into the psychological causes of the existence of the phantasy.



Such an interrogation leads, on the one hand, to the more remote causes of the phantasy in the distant past, and. on the other, to the substantiation of the instinctive forces which, from the energic standpoint, must be made account-able for the existence of the phantasy. As is well known, Freud has made a specially intensive elaboration of this method. It is this method of interpretation to which I have applied the term reductive. The justification of a reductive view is immediately visible; it is also thoroughly intelligible that this method of interpreting psychological realities contains something which for a certain temperament is sufficiently satisfying to obviate any further claims for deeper understanding. If a man has uttered a cry for help, such a fact is adequately and satisfactorily explained when it is shown that the man in question was in instant danger of life. If a man dreams of a lavishly-spread table, and it is shown that he went to bed hungry, a satisfactory explanation of his dream is provided. Or supposing a man who has repressed his sexuality, in the manner of a medieval saint, has sexual phantasies, this fact is sufficiently explained by a reduction to his repressed sexuality.



If, however, we were to explain the vision of St Peter by dwelling upon the fact that he, ”being an-hungered“, had received an invitation from the unconscious to eat animals that were ”unclean”, or that the eating of the unclean beasts merely signified the fulfilment of a forbidden desire with such an explanation we would still go empty away. Neither would our demand find any fuller satisfaction if, for instance, we were to trace the vision of Saul to his repressed envy of the ro1e played by Christ among his fellow-countrymen which brought about his identification with Christ. Both explanations may contain some glimmering of truth, yet they stand in no sort of relation to the real psychology of the two apostles, conditioned as this was by the history and atmosphere of that time.

Such an explanation is both too simple arid too cheap. We cannot discuss the history of the world as though it were a problem of physiology or a mere personal ‘chronique scandaleuse‘. That would be altogether too limited a standpoint. Hence we are compelled very considerably to extend our conception of the latent meaning of phantasy. First of all in its causal aspect, for the psychology of the individual can never be exhaustively explained from himself: a clear recognition is also needed of the way in which his individual psychology is conditioned by contemporary history and circumstances. It is not merely a physiological, biological, or personal problem, but also a question of contemporary history. In fine, no psychological fact can ever be exhaustively explained from its causality alone, since, as a living phenomenon, it is always indissolubly bound up with the continuity of the vital process, so that on the one side it is always something that is, and on the other it is also becoming, and therefore always creative. The psychological moment is Janus-faced it looks both backwards and forwards. Because it is becoming, it also prepares for the future event. Were this not so, intentions, aims, the setting-up of goals, the forecasting or divining of the future would be psychological impossibilities. If, when a man expresses an opinion, we merely relate this circumstance to the fact that at some previous time someone else has also expressed a view, such an explanation is, practically, quite inadequate; for its real understanding, not merely do we wish to know the cause of his action but also what he intends by it, what are his aims and purposes, what does he hope to achieve by it. And usually, when we also know that, we are willing to rest satisfied. In everyday life, we immediately and quite instinctively insert a purposive standpoint into the explanation; indeed, very often we appraise the purposive point-of-view as the decisive one, completely overlooking the strictly causal motive; clearly, in instinctive recognition of the essentially creative factor of the psyche. If we so act in everyday experience, a scientific psychology must also take this circumstance into account, and not rely exclusively upon the strictly causal standpoint originally taken over from natural science ; for it also has to consider the purposive nature of the psychic product.



When we find everyday experience establishing the purposive orientation of the conscious content beyond any sort of doubt, we have absolutely no grounds to assume, in the absence of experience to the contrary, that this may not also be the case with the content of the unconscious. My experience gives me no reason at all to dispute the purposive orientation of unconscious contents ; on the contrary, the cases in which a satisfactory interpretation could alone be attained through the introduction of the purposive standpoint are in the majority. Suppose, for example, we were again to consider the vision of Saul, but this time from the angle of the Pauline world mission, and were now to reach the conclusion that Saul, though a conscious persecutor of Christians, had unconsciously adopted the Christian standpoint, that he was finally brought to avow it by the increasing predominance and final irruption of the unconscious standpoint, and that his unconscious personality was constantly striving towards this goal in an instinctive apprehension of the necessity and importance of such an act. To me this seems a more adequate explanation of the real significance of the event than a reductive interpretation to personal motives, albeit these latter doubtless co-operated in one form or another, since the all-too-human ‘ is never lacking. Similarly, the indication given in the Acts of the Apostles of a purposive interpretation of the vision of St Peter is far more satisfying than a merely physiological and personal conjecture.

To sum up, we may say that phantasy needs to be understood both causally as well as purposively. With the causal explanation it appears as a symptom of a physiological or personal condition, the resultant of previous occurrences; whereas, in the purposive interpretation, phantasy appears as a symbol, which seeks with the help of existing material a clear and definite goal; it strives, as it were, to distinguish or lay hold of a certain line for the future psychological development. Active phantasy being the principal attribute of the artistic mentality, the artist is not merely a represmter: he is also a creator, hence essentially an educator, since his works have the value of symbols that trace out the line of future development.



Whether the actual social validity of the symbol is more general or more restricted depends upon the quality or vital capacity of the creative individuality. The more abnormal the individual, i.e. the less his general fitness for life, the more limited will be the common social value of the symbols he produces, although their value may be absolute for the individuality in question. One has no right to dispute the existence of the latent meaning of phantasy, unless we also cling to the view that the general Nature-process contains no satisfying meaning. But natural science has developed the meaning of the Nature-process into the form of natural laws. These, admittedly, are human hypotheses advanced in explanation of the Nature-process. But, only in so far as we have ascertained that the proposed law actually coincides with the objective process, are we justified in speaking of a meaning of the natural occurrence. Just so far, therefore, as we have succeeded in demonstrating a law-abiding principle in phantasy, are we also justified in speaking of a meaning of the same. But the disclosed meaning is satisfying, or in other words the demonstrated regularity deserves the name, only when it adequately renders the nature of phantasy.



There is a law-abiding regularity in the Nature-process, and also a regularity of the Nature-process. It is certainly law-determined and regular that one dreams when one sleeps; but there is no sort of 'law-determined' principle that affirms anything about the nature of the dream. Its nature is a mere condition of the dream. The demonstration of a physiological source of the phantasy is a mere condition of its existence, not a law of its nature. The law of phantasy as a psychological phenomenon can only be a psychological law.



We now come to the second point of our explanation . of the concept of phantasy, viz. imaginative activity.



Imagination is the reproductive, or creative, activity of the mind generally, though not a special faculty, since it may come into play in all the basic forms of psychic activity, whether thinking, feeling, sensation, or intuition. Phantasy as imaginative activity is, in my view, simply the direct expression of psychic vital activity: it is energy merely appearing in consciousness in the form of images or contents, just as physical energy also reveals itself as a definite physical state wherein sense organs are stimulated in physical ways. For as every physical state from the energic standpoint is merely a dynamic system, so, too, a psychic content regarded energically is merely a dynamic system appearing in consciousness. Hence from this standpoint one may affirm that phantasy in the form of phantasm is merely a definite sum of libido which cannot appear in consciousness in any other way than in the form of an image. Phantasm is an ‘ide-force‘. Phantasy as imaginative activity is identical with the course ot the energic psychic process.

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Power-complex


Power-complex: I occasionally use this term as denoting the total complex of all those ideas and strivings whose tendency it is to range the ego above other influences, thus subordinating all such influences to the ego, quite irrespective of whether they have their source in men and objective conditions, or spring from one’s own subjective impulses, feelings, and thoughts.

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Projection


Projection signifies the transveying of a subjective process into an object. It is the opposite of introjection (q.v.). Accordingly, projection is a process of dissimilation wherein a subjective content is estranged from the subject and, in a sense, incorporated in the object. There are painful, incompatible contents of which the subject unburdens himself by projection, just as there are also positive values which for some reason are uncongenial to the subject; as, for instance, the consequences of self-depreciation. Projection is based upon the archaic identity (q.v.) of subject and object, but the term is used only when the necessity has already arisen for resolving the identity with the object. This necessity arises when the identity is disturbing, i.e. when, through the absence of the projected content, the process of adaptation is materially prejudiced, so that the restoration of the projected content becomes desirable to the subject From this moment the hitherto partial identity maintains the character of projection. This expression, therefore, denotes a state of identity which has become noticeable, and, therefore, the object of criticism, whether it be the self-criticism of the subject or the objective criticism of another.



We may discriminate between passive and active projection. The former is the customary form of every pathological and many normal projections; it springs from no purpose and is a purely automatic occurrence. The latter form is an essential constituent of the act of ‘feeling-into‘.



Feeling-into (q.v.), as a whole, is a process of introjection, since it serves to bring the object into an intimate relation with the subject. In order to establish this relation, the subject detaches a content (a feeling, for instance) from himself; he then transveys it into, therewith animating, the object, which he thus relates to the subjective sphere.



The active form of projection, however, is also an act of judgment which aims at a separation of subject and object. In this case a subjective judgment is detached from the subject as a valid statement of the case, and is transveyed into the object; by so doing the subject distinguishes himself from the object. Accordingly, projection is a process of introversion, since, in contrast to introjection, it leads not to a linking-up and assimilation but to a differentiation and separation of subject from object. Hence it plays a leading part in paranoia, which usually ends in a total isolation of the subject.

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Rational


Rational: The rational is the reasonable, that which accords with reason. I conceive reason as an attitude whose principle is to shape thought, feeling, and action in accordance with objective values. Objective values are established by the average experience of external facts on the one hand, and of inner psychological facts on the other. Such experiences, however, could represent no objective ‘value’, if ‘valued’ as such by the subject ; for this would already amount to an 'act' of reason. But the reasoning attitude, which permits us to declare as valid objective values in general, is not the work of the individual subject, but the product of human history.



Most objective values and reason itself among them are firmly established complexes handed down to us through the ages, to the organization of which countless generations have laboured with the same necessity with which the nature of the living organism, in general, reacts



to the average and constantly recurring conditions of the environment, confronting them with corresponding function-complexes as, for instance, the eye, which so perfectly corresponds with the nature of light. We might, therefore, speak of a pre-existing, metaphysical world-reason, if, as Schopenhauer has already pointed out, the reaction of the living organism that corresponds with average external influence were not the indispensable condition of its existence. Human reason, therefore, is merely the expression of human adaptability to the average occurrence which has gradually become deposited in solidly organized complexes, constituting our objective values. Thus the laws of reason are those laws which rule and designate the average ‘correct‘ or adapted attitude. Everything is rational which harmonizes with these laws, and everything irrational (y.v.) which contravenes them.



Thinking and feeling are rational functions in so far as they are decisively influenced by the motive of reflection. They attain their fullest significance when in fullest possible accord with the laws of reason. The irrational functions, on the contrary, are such as aim at pure perception, e.g. intuition and sensation; because, as far as possible, they are forced to dispense with the rational (which presupposes the exclusion of everything that is outside reason) in order to be able to reach the most complete perception of the whole course of events.

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Reductive


Reductive (‘leading back‘): I employ this expression to denote-that method of psychological interpretation which regards the unconscious product not from the symbolic point of view, but merely as a semiotic expression, a sort of sign or symptom of an underlying process. Accordingly, the reductive method treats the unconscious product in the sense of a leading-back to the elements and basic processes, irrespective of whether such products are reminiscences of actual events, or whether they arise from elementary processes affecting the psyche. Hence, the reductive method is orientated backwards (in contrast to the constructive method; q.v.), whether in the historical sense or in the merely figurative sense of a tracing back of complex and differentiated factors to the general and elementary. The methods both of Freud and of Adler are reductive, since in both cases there is a reduction to elementary processes either of wishing or striving, which in the last resort are infantile or primitive. Hence the unconscious product necessarily acquires the value of a merely figurative or unreal expression, for which the term ‘symbol‘ (q.v.) is really not applicable.



The effect of reduction as regards the real significance of the unconscious product is disintegrating, since it is either traced back to its historical antecedents, and so robbed of its intrinsic significance, or it is once again reintegrated into the same elementary process from which it arose.

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Sensation


Sensation: According to my conception, this is one of the basic psychological functions (v. Function). Wundt also reckons sensation among the elementary psychic phenomena.



Sensation, or sensing, is that psychological function which transmits a physical stimulus to perception. It is, therefore, identical with perception. Sensation must be strictly distinguished from feeling, since the latter is an entirely different process, although it may, for instance, be associated with sensation as 'feeling-tone'. Sensation is related not only to the outer stimuli, but also to the inner, i.e. to changes in the internal organs.



Primarily, therefore, sensation is sense-perception, i.e. perception transmitted via the sense organs and ‘bodily senses’ (kinaesthetic, vaso-motor sensation, etc.). On the one hand, it is an element of presentation, since it transmits to the presenting function the perceived image of the outer object; on the other hand, it is an element of feeling, because through the perception of bodily changes it lends the character of affect to feeling, (v. Affect). Because sensation transmits physical changes to consciousness, it also represents the physiological impulse. But it is not identical with it, since it is merely a perceptive function.



A distinction must be made between sensuous, or concrete, and abstract sensation. The former includes the forms above alluded to, whereas the latter designates an abstracted kind of sensation, i.e. a sensation that is separated from other psychological elements. For concrete sensation never appears as ‘pure‘ sensation, but is always mixed up with presentations, feelings, and thoughts. Abstract sensation, on the contrary, represents a differentiated kind of perception which might be termed 'aesthetic' in so far as it follows its own principle and is as equally detached from every admixture of the differences of the perceived object as from the subjective admixture of feeling and thought, thus raising itself to a degree of purity which is never attained by concrete sensation. The concrete sensation of a flower, for instance, transmits not only the perception of the flower itself, but also an image of the stem, leaves, habitat, etc. It is also directly mingled with the feelings of pleasure or dislike which the sight of it provokes, or with the scent-perceptions simultaneously excited, or with thoughts concerning its botanical classification. Abstract sensation, on the other hand, immediately picks out the most salient sensuous attribute of the flower, as for instance its brilliant redness, and makes it the sole or at least the principal content of consciousness, entirely detached from all the other admixtures alluded to above. Abstract sensation is mainly suited to the artist. Like every abstraction, it is a product of the differentiation of function: hence there is nothing primordial about it. The primordial form of the function is always concrete, i.e. blended (v. Archaism, and Concretism). Concrete sensation as such is a reactive phenomenon, while abstract sensation, like every abstraction, is always linked up with the will, i.e. the element of direction. The will that is directed towards the abstraction of sensation is both the expression and the activity of the asthetic sensational attitude.



Sensation is a prominent characteristic both in the child and the primitive, in so far as it always predominates over thinking and feeling, though not necessarily over intuition. For I regard sensation as conscious, and intuition as unconscious, perception. For me, sensation and intuition represent a pair of opposites, or two mutually compensating functions, like thinking and feeling. Thinking and feeling as independent functions are developed, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically, from sensation (and equally, of course, from intuition as the necessary counterpart of sensation).



In so far as sensation is an elementary phenomenon, it is something absolutely given, something that, in contrast to thinking and feeling, is not subject to the laws of reason. I therefore term it an irrational (q.v.) function, although reason contrives to assimilate a great number of sensations into rational associations.



A man whose whole attitude is orientated by the principle of sensation belongs to the sensation type (v. Types).



Normal sensations are proportionate, i.e. their value approximately corresponds with the intensity of the physical stimulus. Pathological sensations are disproportionate, i.e. either abnormally weak or abnormally strong: in the former case they are inhibited, in the latter exaggerated. The inhibition is the result of the predominance of another function; the exaggeration proceeds from an abnormal amalgamation with another function, e.g. a blending with a still undifferentiated feeling or thinking function. In such a case, the exaggeration of sensation ceases as soon as the function with which sensation is fused is differentiated in its own right.



The psychology of the neuroses yields extremely illuminating examples of this, where, for instance, a strong sexualization (Freud) of other functions very often prevails, i.e. a blending of sexual sensation with other functions.

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Soul (Anima)


Soul (Anima): I have found sufficient cause, in my investigations into the structure of the unconscious, to make a conceptual distinction between the soul and the psyche. By the psyche I understand the totality of all the psychic processes, both conscious as well as unconscious; whereas by soul I understand a definitely demarcated function-complex that is best characterized as a ‘personality’. In order to describe more exactly what I mean by this, I must introduce still remoter points of view such, in particular, as the phenomena of somnambulism, of character-duplication, of dissociation of personality, the investigation of which is primarily due to French research, and which has enabled us to recognize the possibility of a plurality of personalities in one and the same individual.



It is at once evident that such a plurality of personalities can never appear in a normal individual; but the possibility of a dissociation of personality which these cases represent must also exist, at least potentially, within the range of normality. And, as a matter of fact, a moderately acute psychological observation can succeed without much difficulty in proving at least the traces of character-splitting in the normal individual. For example, we have only to observe a man rather closely under varying circumstances, to discover that a transition from one milieu to another brings about a striking alteration in his personality, whereby a sharply-outlined and distinctly changed character emerges. The proverbial expression ‘angel abroad, and devil at home ‘ is a formulation of the phenomenon of character-splitting derived from everyday experience. A definite milieu demands a definite attitude. Corresponding with the duration or frequency with which such a milieu-attitude is demanded, the more or less habitual it becomes. Great numbers of men of the educated classes are obliged to move in two, for the most part totally different, milieux viz. in the family and domestic circle and in the world of affairs. These two totally different environments demand two totally different attitudes, which, in proportion to the degree of identification (q.v.) of the ego with the momentary attitude, produce a duplication of character. In accordance with social conditions and necessities, the social character is orientated, on the one hand by the expectations or obligations of the social milieu, and on the other by the social aims and efforts of the subject. The domestic character is, as a rule, more the product of the subject’s laissez-aller indolence and emotional demands; whence it frequently happens that men who in public life are extremely energetic, bold, obstinate, wilful, and inconsiderate appear good-natured, mild, accommodating, even weak, when at home within the sphere of domesticity. Which, then, is the true character, the real personality? This is a question it is often impossible to answer.



This brief consideration will show that, even in the normal individual, character-splitting is by no means an impossibility. We are, therefore, perfectly justified in treating the question of dissociation of personality also as a problem of normal psychology. According to my view then to pursue the discussion the above question should be met with a frank avowal that such a man has no real character at all, i.e. he is not individual (q.v.) but collective (q.v.), i.e. he corresponds with general circumstances and expectations. Were he an individual, he would have but one and the same character with every variation of attitude. It would not be identical with the momentary attitude, neither could it nor would it prevent his individuality from finding expression in one state just as clearly as in another. He is an individual, of course, like every being; but an unconscious one. Through his more or less complete identification with the attitude of the moment, he at least deceives others, and also often himself, as to his real character. He puts on a mask, which he knows corresponds with his conscious intentions, while it also meets with the requirements and opinions of his environment, so that first one motive then the other is in the ascendant. This mask, viz. the ad hoc adopted attitude, I have called ihepersona which was the designation given to the mask worn by the actors of antiquity. A man who is identified with this mask I would call “personal” (as opposed to “individual”).



Both the attitudes of the case considered above are collective personalities, which may be simply summed up under the name ”persona” or ”personae“. I have already suggested above that the real individuality is different from both. Thus, the persona is a function-complex which has come into existence for reasons of adaptation or necessary convenience, but by no means is it identical with the individuality. The function-complex of the persona is exclusively concerned with the relation to the object.

The relation of the individual to the outer object must be sharply distinguished from the relation to the subject. By the subject I mean those vague, dim stirrings, feelings, thoughts, and sensations which have no demonstrable flow towards the object from the continuity of conscious experience, but well up like a disturbing, inhibiting, or at times beneficent, influence from the dark inner depths, from the background and underground of consciousness which, in their totality, constitute one’s perception of the unconscious life. The subject, conceived as the inner 'object', is the unconscious. There is a relation to the inner object, viz. an inner attitude, just as there is a relation to the outer object, viz. an outer attitude. It is quite intelligible that this inner attitude, by reason of its extremely intimate and inaccessible nature, is far less widely known than the outer attitude, which is immediately perceived by everyone. Nevertheless, the task of making a concept of this inner attitude does not seem to me impossible. All those so-called accidental inhibitions, fancies, moods, vague feelings, and fragments of phantasy, which occasionally harass and disturb the accomplishment of concentrated work, not to mention the repose of the most normal of men, and which evoke rational explanations either in the form of physical causes or reasons of like nature, usually have their origin, not in the reasons ascribed to them by consciousness, but in the perceptions of unconscious processes, which, in fact, they are. Among such phenomena, dreams also naturally belong : these are admittedly liable to be accounted for by such external and superficial causes as indigestion, sleeping on one’s back, and the like, in spite of the fact that such explanations never withstand a searching criticism. The attitude of individual men to these things is extremely variable. One man will not allow himself to be disturbed in the smallest degree by his inner processes he can, as it were, ignore them entirely; while another is in the highest degree subject to them : at the first waking-moment some phantasy or other, or a disagreeable feeling, spoils his temper for the whole day ; a vague, unpleasant sensation suggests the idea of a secret malady, or a dream leaves him with a gloomy foreboding, although in other ways he is by no means superstitious. To others, again, these unconscious stirrings have only a very episodic access, or only a certain category of them come to the surface. For one man, perhaps, they have onever yet appeared to consciousness as anything worth thinking about, while for another they are a problem of daily brooding. The one values them physiologically, or ascribes them to the conduct of his neighbours; another finds in them a religious revelation.

These entirely different ways of dealing with the stirrings of the unconscious are just as habitual as the attitudes to the outer object. The inner attitude, therefore, corresponds with just as definite a function-complex as the outer attitude. Those cases in which the inner psychic processes appear to be entirely overlooked are lacking a typical inner attitude just as little as those who constantly overlook the outer object and the reality of facts lack a typical outer attitude. The persona of these latter, by no means infrequent, cases has the character of unrelatedness, or at times even a blind inconsiderateness, which frequently yields only to the harshest blows of fate. Not seldom, it is just those individuals whose persona is characterized by a rigid inconsiderateness and absence oi relations who possess an attitude to the unconscious processes which suggests a character of extreme susceptibility. As they are inflexible and inaccessible outwardly, so are they weak, flaccid, and determinable in relation to their inner processes. In such cases, therefore, the inner attitude corresponds with an inner personality diametrically opposed and different from the outer. I know a man, for instance, who without pity blindly destroyed the happiness of those nearest to him, and yet he would interrupt his journey when travelling on important business just to enjoy the beauty of a forest scene glimpsed from the carriage window. Cases of this kind are doubtless familiar to everyone; it is needless therefore to enumerate further examples. With the same justification as daily experience furnishes us for speaking of an outer personality are we also justified in assuming the existence of an inner personality. The inner personality is the manner of one’s behaviour towards the inner psychic processes; it is the inner attitude, the character, that is turned towards the unconscious. I term the outer attitude, or outer character, the persona, the inner attitude I term the antma, or soul. In the same degree as an attitude is habitual, is it a more or less firmly welded function-complex, with which the ego may be more or less identified. This is plastically expressed in language: of a man who has an habitual attitude towards certain situations, we are accustomed to say: he is quite another man when doing this or that. This is a practical demonstration of the independence of the function-complex of an habitual attitude; it is as though another personality had taken possession of the individual, as ‘though another spirit had entered into him‘. The same autonomy as is so often granted to the outer attitude is also claimed by the soul or inner attitude. One of the most difficult of all educational achievements is this task of changing the outer attitude, or persona. But to change the soul is just as difficult, since its structure tends to be just as firmly welded as is that of the persona.



Just as the persona is an entity, which often appears to constitute the whole character of a man, even accompanying him practically without change throughout his entire life, so the soul is also a definitely circumscribed entity, with a character which may prove unalterably firm and independent. Hence, it frequently offers itself to characterization and description.



As regards the character of the soul, my experience confirms the validity of the general principle that it maintains, on the whole, a complementary relation to the outer character. Experience teaches us that the soul is wont to contain all those general human qualities the conscious attitude lacks. The tyrant tormented by bad dreams, gloomy forebodings, and inner fears, is a typical figure. Outwardly inconsiderate, harsh, and unapproachable, he is inwardly susceptible to every shadow, and subject to every fancy, as Chough he were the least independent, and the most impressionable, of men. Thus his soul contains those general human qualities of suggestibility and weakness which are wholly lacking in his outer attitude, or persona. Where the persona is intellectual, the soul is quite certainly sentimental. That the complementary character of the soul is also concerned with the sex-character is a fact which can no longer seriously be doubted. A very feminine woman has a masculine soul, and a very manly man a feminine soul. This opposition is based upon the fact that a man, for instance, is not in all things wholly masculine, but has also certain feminine traits. The more manly his outer attitude, the more will his womanly traits be effaced; these then appear in the soul. This circumstance explains why it is that the very manly men are most subject to characteristic weaknesses; their attitude to the unconscious has a womanly weakness and impressionability. And, vice versa, it is often just the most womanly women who, in respect of certain inner things, have an extreme intractableness, obstinacy, and wilfulness; which qualities are found in such intensity only in the outer attitude of men. These are manly traits, whose exclusion from the womanly outer attitude makes them qualities of the soul. If, therefore, we speak of the anima of a man, we must logically speak of the animus of a woman, if we are to give the soul of a woman its right name. Whereas logic and objective reality commonly prevail in the outer attitude of man, or are at least regarded as an ideal, in the case of woman it is feeling. But in the soul the relations are reversed: inwardly it is the man who feels, and the woman who reflects. Hence man’s greater liability to total despair, while a woman can always find comfort and hope; hence man is more liable to put an end to himself than woman. However prone a woman may be to fall a victim to social circumstances, as in prostitution for instance, a man is equally delivered over to impulses from the unconscious in the form of alcoholism and other vices.




As regards the general human characters, the character of the soul may be deduced from that of the persona. Everything which should normally be in the outer attitude, but is decidedly wanting there, will invariably be found in the inner attitude. This is a basic rule, which my experience has borne out again and again. But, as regards individual qualities, nothing can be deduced about them in this way. We can be certain only that, when a man is identical with his persona, the individual qualities are associated with the soul. It is this association which gives rise to the symbol, so often appearing in dreams, of the soul’s pregnancy; this symbol has its source in the primordial image of the hero-birth. The child that is to be born signifies the individuality, which, though existing, is not yet conscious. Hence in the same way as the persona, which expresses one’s adaptation to the milieu, is as a rule strongly influenced and shaped by the milieu, so the soul is just as profoundly moulded by the unconscious and its qualities. Just as the persona, almost necessarily, takes on primitive traits in a primitive milieu, so the soul assumes the archaic characters of the unconscious as well as its prospective, symbolic character. Whence arise the 'pregnant' and 'creative' qualities of the inner attitude. Identity with the persona automatically conditions an unconscious identity with the soul, because, when the subject or ego is not differentiated from the persona, it can have no conscious relation to the processes of the unconscious. Hence it is these processes: it is identical with them. The man who is unconditionally his outer role therewith delivers himself over unquestioningly to the inner processes, i.e. he will even frustrate his outer role by absolute inner necessity, reducing it ad absurdum (enantiodromia; q.v.). A steady holding to the individual line is thereby excluded, and his life runs its course in inevitable opposition. Moreover, in such a case the soul is always projected into a corresponding, real object, with which a relation of almost absolute dependence exists. Every reaction proceeding from this object has an immediate, inwardly arresting effect upon the subject. Tragic ties are frequently formed in this way (v. Soul-image).